Tuesday, February 24, 2026

Time for a rethink on competition policy

At its core, the neoliberalism was a change in public policy based on a faith in competitive markets as both a cost discipline on providers and the harbinger of the benefits of choice for consumers. 

It is true that neoliberalism was ultimately a culmination of decades of campaigning by think tanks all ultimately driven by the work of Fredrick Hayek. However, it was embraced by left-leaning governments for what it promised to do for consumers.

The changes were heavily supported by big business. It was big business that lobbied for the deregulation of telecommunicaions. It was driven by concerns about the extent of the cross subsidy from business to residential consumers ad the slowness of Telecom Australia in developing data products to support the suddenly burgeoning field of computing.

Big business lobbied for the dergulation of airlines as the intercity routes were seen to be over-priced. No one seems to have lobbied on energy prices directly; it got swept up in a review of state government taxes and charges that otherwise fed into Keating's plans for a broad based consumpion tax.

In two big sectors - telecommunications and energy - we have repeatedly experienced cases of what id politely called 'misselling'. At its simplest this consists of slamming - actioning a change of provider without authorisation. In its more subtle form approval is obtained by deception; the deception often relies upon the limited ability of the targeted consumers to engage with the product. 

Separately there is no evidence that the creation of competition improved price outcomes for consumers. The rate of decrease of real prices in telecommunications has been unchanged - it is driven by an experience effect and scale efficiency. Energy is a sadder story.

Despite the problems and the absence of benefits, faith in competition and the value of choice to consumers has driven public policy. The Gillard government was responsible for two policies that have played out badly. The first was creating a level playing field for private sector providers in vocational training. Aside from a proliferation of institutions primarily trading in overseas students, the regulatory and quality accreditation scheme did almost nothing to keep poor providers out at the bottom, it created additional central bureaucracies at the public Universities.

The second was the NDIS with its focus on choice of provider for recipients of payments. But choice is often illusory as there is only one local provider, or where there is more than one the consumer has no ability to determine the differences between the providers before committing. The use of caps on charges roviders can levy in practice works out often to be a market price. 

The most recent case is superannuation. Here the changes were championed by the Coalition. While dressed up in the same competition policy language, the motivation was a distaste for 'industry' funds that do provide some financial support from associated unions for their assistance in marketing. The consequence has not been a shift of consumers to better performing funds; it has exposed super consumers to the same 'misselling' tactics seen in other sectors.

Super Consumers Australia has reported these practices. In this case the model is agents on commission selling consumers inyto failing funds.

It is time to call 'bullshit' on the premise of competition policy. Here are the principles that need to be applied:
  1. Are consumers in a position to be able to make an informed choice betwen providers before experiencing the service?
  2. Is the information assymetry likely to facilitate misselling?
  3. Is it conceivable that there are efficiency gains from competition that will be higher than the added costs of sales, marketing and compliance?
The emperor isn't in a fancy new suit at all!


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Life is what happens while you are busy making other plans JWL

Monday, February 09, 2026

Time to review governance of the energy system, not just AEMO

The capacity for the Collective of Energy Ministers* to commission reviews seems to have no bounds. The latest review – of AEMO’s governance arrangements – is yet another element of a piecemeal approach.

The review terms of reference were announced on 5February on the basis of a decision apparently made at the December 2025 meeting of the collective.  However, the communique fromthat meeting does not appear to include this decision (), which is reflective of how poor the overall governance arrangements are. More significantly, the Terms of Reference detail a set of changes that have occurred in the market over time but provide no compelling evidence of the problem that the review is trying to address.

The ToR explicitly exclude consideration of the overarching national energy governance framework and architecture.  This is an unsurprising decision given the extent to which the Collective now represents the ambitions of the bureaucrats in the various states to have as much freedom as possible in determining their energy policy, while still being able to blame the Commonwealth for any failing.

 Almost 100 years ago, Alex Gibson provided a report on PowerDevelopment in Australia that was tabled in the Commonwealth Parliament on 5 September 1929, during the industrial relations debate that led to the downfall of the Bruce Government. The timing seems to be the reason why there is no substantive Commonwealth action arising from the report.  The report observed that leading countries of the world were paying the closest attention to power development as electric power was the ‘basis of improved production and national prosperity and wealth.’  The report called for the ‘complete coordination’ of power development which included calls to create State Commissions in those states that did not already have one – especially NSW and Queensland.** It also recommended the Commonwealth establish an instrumentality which would work with the State Commissions to take control of hydro electric resources, to establish standards, to be responsible for interstate connections and trade, and to support the states and where it provides financial assistance take full responsibility.

 It took NSW another twenty years to establish its electricity commission; it took sixty years till any kind of entity was created at the Commonwealth level (through the formation of the collective). Just over a decade ago Michael Vertigan’s Review of Governance Arrangements forAustralian Energy Markets report included a review of governance of AEMO concluding that the governance arrangements should not change. The Vertigan review recommended that the Collective assess the requirements for another independent governance review in 2023. I have found no evidence of this assessment occurring. In the period between the Vertigan review and today the governance arrangements saw the crazy foray post Finkel into the Energy Security Board, an entity that achieved precisely nothing – its attempts at carbon policy (the NEG) coming to nothing and its post 2025 market design project having minimal impact.

The failure of Australian Energy Markets to deliver the outcomes businesses and households need can be traced to the very top of the governance structure. The operation of ‘uniform’ legislation enacted by the SA Parliament, and governance by the Collective is an inadequate. This was identified by me in a submission to the review of the statement of the energy objectives (NICE Submission FINAL.pdf). That submission called on the Commonwealth Government to utilise existing heads of power to take full responsibility for energy market institutions, utilising the corporations, interstate trade and foreign affairs powers. In a later submission to last year’s economic roundtable I made the case for a facilitated process for the increase in Commonwealth legislative powers as a key determinant of increased productivity ( Economic Roundtable Submission.pdf).

* I refer to the Energy and Climate Change Ministerial Council as the Collective of Energy Ministers to provide a single term to refer to all the iterations of the council.

** As an aside, the report called for the national standardisation of ‘system frequency and pressure (voltage) for transmission and distribution.

 


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Life is what happens while you are busy making other plans JWL