The distressing fact about the NBN remains the fact that whether we need it remains "contested ground". Malcolm Turnbull continues to make inroads by repeating that no one can tell him why every household needs 100Mbps. He might like to reflect on the fact that when he first ran OzEmail and all customers used 300bps he probably couldn't have imagined why anyone would even need 1Mbps.
News today that the Government is planning a campaign based on twelve NBN champions. Pity that one of the names, Rosemary Sinclair, has already resigned as CEO of ATUG.
The item continues;
Details of the campaign are expected next month, when the government is set to unveil a strategy for turning Australia into a ''world-leading'' digital economy by 2020, when the network is due to be nearly complete.
Under the national digital economy strategy, the government has pledged to introduce policies that will help households and businesses make the most of the network, as well as providing a "road map of what an NBN-enabled world will look like"
This is a much looked forward to announcement planned for late May by Senator Conroy. This is the next stage following the string of Digital Economy initiatives. The current foundation stone of that is the document Future Directions of the Digital Economy.
I have a distinct disagreement with the government over the definition of the Digital Economy, and as a consequence the correct policy response.
The Government defines the Digital Economy as;
The global network of economic and social activities that are enabled by information and communications technologies, such as the internet, mobile and sensor networks.
As a definition this at best defines part of the economy. Its limitation is the failure to recognise ICT as a General Purpose Technology (GPT) and hence that ALL economic activity is impacted or enabled in some way. A farmer who uses the Bureau of Meteorology website to access a weather forecast to decide when to plant or harvest is engaged in a digital economy activity.
To see the distinction imagine if we defined the Industrial Economy as the global and social activities enabled by the steam engine, internal combustion engine and electric motor?
The change from an agricultural society to the modern industrial society that accompanied these technologies has not just been one of degree (i.e. of productivity), but of kind. Both capitalism as we know it, and democracy as we know it were products of the industrial revolution.
Phillip Bobbit's thesis is that ICTs were one of the two defining technologies (along with weapons of mass destruction) that brought the long war from 1914 to 1990 to an end. The question he then poses is what does the "constitutional order" of the market state look like.
There is plenty of evidence that the societies that work out the constitutional order for new epochs (to use Marx's term) first are the most successful.
The Government in its strategy states;
The key elements to a successful digital economy are a Government that is digitally aware and enabling; industry that is digitally confident, innovative and skilled; and a community that is digitally empowered and literate.
To that needs to be added "a Government and society that are prepared to examine the implications of the digital economy on the organisation of the economy and to react positively to the change."
Novae Meridianae Demetae Dexter delenda est
Showing posts with label Bobbitt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bobbitt. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Thursday, April 14, 2011
Gallipoli
It is that time of year again - getting close to Anzac Day - where the skirmish in the so-called "History Wars" where the significance of the Dardanelles campaign aka Gallipoli is debated.
One side - let us call it the left - argues the whole of WWI was a disastrous consequence of the pathetic European escapade to form global empires, and that the campaign in the Dardanelles in particular was a folly and that it represented the worst of imperialism (as so many tropps came from the colonies) and of the class system (the troops were regarded as expendable).
On the other we have the conservatives who think that the campaign was the making of Australia as a nation, where we came into our own and that it was a noble action as part of a noble cause.
An interesting point is that these two views don't necessarily have to be in opposition. It is just that the conservatives are so desperate to cling to the ANZAC glory story that they cannot admit that the Australian troops may have performed well and learnt a lot from a campaign that was itself futile.
VicN has previously put me on to the truly great The Pity of War
by Niall Ferguson. It is an excellent account of the accounts of the war, suggesting in turn that it wasn't as easily avoidable as some might think, nor was it any easier to end. But that its till was monumental.
The latest contribution is from Ross Cameron in the SMH. In a deviation that also seems to want to embrace the "great man" theory of history, his take is to try to defend Churchill's role in the campaign.
It is a trite point to suggest that it was "an empire ending" decision by the Ottomans to enter the war on the side of Germany. An alternative history with the Ottoman's staying neutral probably results in the victors coming down to take them lout anyway, and the decision to side with the Germans was really created by the hostility from the British to begin with.
Both Bobbitt and Ferguson (see earlier posts)label the war that started in 1914 a long war that ended in 1990, it was the war that almost had to happen to end the era of empires, and to decide between totalitarian and democratic states.
The suggestion by Cameron is that if the Dardanelles campaign had been successful, the West could have supported Russia and then the Russians would never have been under the strain that led to the 1917 revolution(s).
The leap that Cameron goes through on communism is extraordinary. To argue that the presence of only 10 people at Marx's funeral in 1883 means that he was an "obscure radical" is to ignore the reality of how widespread socialist and communist organisation was in the first decade of the twentieth century. The revolution in Russia of 1917 merely followed that of 1905. The trigger in both cases was war, but just as France in 1789 ultimately it requires some national pressure to trigger the revolution.
But the fact the Dardanelles campaign failed is the important part, not whether its motives were right. The question is not whether getting relief for Russia was good, but whether this campaign was the way to achieve it.
The short answer is "no". It was a campaign that effectively relied upon accuracy of execution and speed - it failed because it was delayed six weeks waiting for troops from the UK, people were landed in the wrong place and the Turks were able to get defences in place (also in part because the extent of the Turkish defences were under-estimated).
The second planning error was to not have a plan B. What were they to do if they did not succeed in capturing the heights immediately? (That should be plan C because the land invasion was Plan B after the attempt using naval forces alone failed).
Cameron extends his Churchill praise to the calls he made to support the White Russians after the revolution. That intervention had disastrous consequences, as it more than anything else fueled the isolationism that was the hall-mark of the USSR. Leaving the revolution to the Russians was probably the better chance the West had of the eventual government being more democratic and less totalitarian.
Churchill was neither a goose nor a hero. He was a man in history who happened to be in roles requiring decisions, some of which were good and some of which were bad. Even his decisions that turned out good may well not have been the best available.
It is really hard to escape from the conclusion that the British with their empire and US friends were victorious over first the militaristic and imperial Prussian led Germans and then the totalitarians of left and right because of the strength of the idea of the democracies they ran.
Gallipoli was a stupid campaign, but no more stupid than the rest of that stupid war. For better or worse it was the first time the united colonies of Australia exercised themselves as a unified body in an external affairs way (one of the twin purposes of federation) and did okay. They might have done better in a different battle or with different leaders. But the very nature of that war was of pointless endeavour between armies that were able to incredibly damage each other without prosecuting victory.
It should be remembered for what it was - a tragic loss of life.
Note: I think Cameron seriously errs in writing "Three naval-only attempts failed to secure the Dardanelles so troops (principally Aussies and Kiwis at first) landed on Ottoman soil on April 25, 1915." They were Aussies and Kiwis at what is now known as ANZAC Cove but British and others in the main landing at Cape Helles.
Novae Meridianae Demetae Dexter delenda est
One side - let us call it the left - argues the whole of WWI was a disastrous consequence of the pathetic European escapade to form global empires, and that the campaign in the Dardanelles in particular was a folly and that it represented the worst of imperialism (as so many tropps came from the colonies) and of the class system (the troops were regarded as expendable).
On the other we have the conservatives who think that the campaign was the making of Australia as a nation, where we came into our own and that it was a noble action as part of a noble cause.
An interesting point is that these two views don't necessarily have to be in opposition. It is just that the conservatives are so desperate to cling to the ANZAC glory story that they cannot admit that the Australian troops may have performed well and learnt a lot from a campaign that was itself futile.
VicN has previously put me on to the truly great The Pity of War
by Niall Ferguson. It is an excellent account of the accounts of the war, suggesting in turn that it wasn't as easily avoidable as some might think, nor was it any easier to end. But that its till was monumental.The latest contribution is from Ross Cameron in the SMH. In a deviation that also seems to want to embrace the "great man" theory of history, his take is to try to defend Churchill's role in the campaign.
It is a trite point to suggest that it was "an empire ending" decision by the Ottomans to enter the war on the side of Germany. An alternative history with the Ottoman's staying neutral probably results in the victors coming down to take them lout anyway, and the decision to side with the Germans was really created by the hostility from the British to begin with.
Both Bobbitt and Ferguson (see earlier posts)label the war that started in 1914 a long war that ended in 1990, it was the war that almost had to happen to end the era of empires, and to decide between totalitarian and democratic states.
The suggestion by Cameron is that if the Dardanelles campaign had been successful, the West could have supported Russia and then the Russians would never have been under the strain that led to the 1917 revolution(s).
The leap that Cameron goes through on communism is extraordinary. To argue that the presence of only 10 people at Marx's funeral in 1883 means that he was an "obscure radical" is to ignore the reality of how widespread socialist and communist organisation was in the first decade of the twentieth century. The revolution in Russia of 1917 merely followed that of 1905. The trigger in both cases was war, but just as France in 1789 ultimately it requires some national pressure to trigger the revolution.
But the fact the Dardanelles campaign failed is the important part, not whether its motives were right. The question is not whether getting relief for Russia was good, but whether this campaign was the way to achieve it.
The short answer is "no". It was a campaign that effectively relied upon accuracy of execution and speed - it failed because it was delayed six weeks waiting for troops from the UK, people were landed in the wrong place and the Turks were able to get defences in place (also in part because the extent of the Turkish defences were under-estimated).
The second planning error was to not have a plan B. What were they to do if they did not succeed in capturing the heights immediately? (That should be plan C because the land invasion was Plan B after the attempt using naval forces alone failed).
Cameron extends his Churchill praise to the calls he made to support the White Russians after the revolution. That intervention had disastrous consequences, as it more than anything else fueled the isolationism that was the hall-mark of the USSR. Leaving the revolution to the Russians was probably the better chance the West had of the eventual government being more democratic and less totalitarian.
Churchill was neither a goose nor a hero. He was a man in history who happened to be in roles requiring decisions, some of which were good and some of which were bad. Even his decisions that turned out good may well not have been the best available.
It is really hard to escape from the conclusion that the British with their empire and US friends were victorious over first the militaristic and imperial Prussian led Germans and then the totalitarians of left and right because of the strength of the idea of the democracies they ran.
Gallipoli was a stupid campaign, but no more stupid than the rest of that stupid war. For better or worse it was the first time the united colonies of Australia exercised themselves as a unified body in an external affairs way (one of the twin purposes of federation) and did okay. They might have done better in a different battle or with different leaders. But the very nature of that war was of pointless endeavour between armies that were able to incredibly damage each other without prosecuting victory.
It should be remembered for what it was - a tragic loss of life.
Note: I think Cameron seriously errs in writing "Three naval-only attempts failed to secure the Dardanelles so troops (principally Aussies and Kiwis at first) landed on Ottoman soil on April 25, 1915." They were Aussies and Kiwis at what is now known as ANZAC Cove but British and others in the main landing at Cape Helles.
Novae Meridianae Demetae Dexter delenda est
Monday, April 11, 2011
More on the future of the ALP
We are all doing it, writing about the future prospects for the ALP. Writing for National Times a Melbourne lawyer and long-time ALP member poses the question Should the ALP labour on, or is the party over?.
It is probably best described as a classic in its analysis. It trumps out the whole "the market has won" but the ALP has lost its social voice. I think he is right to point out that without an ideology the ALP doesn't stand for anything ... or stand a chance. The NSW Right displaced the achievement of power for any other goal, and so once it achieved power the only thing it knew how to do was to distribute the rewards of power.
But the Left I may say was not much better. Before my departure from the ALP the first time (in the early 90s largely because of time commitments) I had been revolted at the site of Senator Bruce Childs proclaiming to the Bennelong FEC (he was duty Senator) how great two wins for the Left had been. The first was against a broad-based consumption tax and the latter retention of tariffs to protect the Clothing, Textiles and Footwear industry. He didn't seem to get the contradiction between believing the price of goods to consumers should not be driven up by policy and yet advocating protection that drove up the price of goods. It didn't have a coherent economic narrative.
The writer draws on the Fukuyama thesis in The End of History
that the great debate of the twentieth century had been settled saying;
The collapse of the centrally planned economies discredited that model of society and vindicated market economies, in which the role of government was to regulate lightly to ensure the efficient function of the market.
However he goes on to express his own reservations with markets and expressed the view that;
Had that direction [of Hawke and Keating] continued, Labor might have produced a coherent ideology for the 21st century, based on the idea that the market is a good servant but a bad master and reserving sufficient scope for government intervention to underwrite basic living standards: capitalism with a heart, if you like.
He goes on to suggest that social policy alone might not be the saviour,
Having embraced the right's economic policies and been wedged out of any meaningful differentiation from the right, can Labor find salvation in social policy? The answer is a resounding ''no'' and the reason, ironically, is because the right has converged with the left on social policy, thereby creating a strong consensus similar to that which prevails in economic policy.
Firstly I think that the conclusion of the victory of market economies needs to be seen in the broader context of Phillip Bobbit's work - in particular Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century
. This is his analysis of the issues confronting us now based on his historical analysis in The Shield of Achilles
. That work advances what could be seen as a modern rework of dialectic materialism, arguing as it does that the "world" (read Europe and the European invaded world) has gone through a series of revolutionary phases out of which a new system of government has emerged.
The last phase of this was the war that ran from 1914 to 1990 between totalitarianism and market economies (as best described in Fergusson's The War of the World
).
But we don't really know what the market state needs to look like, and it is incredibly exposed to terrorism. I'd extend the definition of terrorism though to include "corporate terrorism" by which I mean the actions of Transnational Corporations and their ultimate disregard of social institutions.
One difficulty for the left in all this is finding out what it stands for. One consequence has been a modern version of the "left" that defines itself by opposing anything the USA stands for - and hence will side with misogynist and oppressive regimes in opposition to the US (in particular the left's view of the war in Iraq).
Part of the difficulty is created by thinking that only the left has "compassion", which is not true. It is not even as simple as the left's greater belief in equality over the right.
Ultimately what should unite the left is the concern over power. Unions represent the need to empower workers against the interests of capital, feminism is a response to the power of men in society, the new left concern about the US is a dual concern over its single power as a "super-power" and the economic power of the many TNCs that call it home.
There is a place, indeed a need, for a strong social democratic party. It needs to be internally structured democratically for internal governance, the development of policy and the selection of candidates. But it needs a political philosophy and core set of beliefs that it seeks to promote.
That could be the future for the ALP if it is willing. Or it is an opportunity for an entirely new structure.
Novae Meridianae Demetae Dexter delenda est
It is probably best described as a classic in its analysis. It trumps out the whole "the market has won" but the ALP has lost its social voice. I think he is right to point out that without an ideology the ALP doesn't stand for anything ... or stand a chance. The NSW Right displaced the achievement of power for any other goal, and so once it achieved power the only thing it knew how to do was to distribute the rewards of power.
But the Left I may say was not much better. Before my departure from the ALP the first time (in the early 90s largely because of time commitments) I had been revolted at the site of Senator Bruce Childs proclaiming to the Bennelong FEC (he was duty Senator) how great two wins for the Left had been. The first was against a broad-based consumption tax and the latter retention of tariffs to protect the Clothing, Textiles and Footwear industry. He didn't seem to get the contradiction between believing the price of goods to consumers should not be driven up by policy and yet advocating protection that drove up the price of goods. It didn't have a coherent economic narrative.
The writer draws on the Fukuyama thesis in The End of History
that the great debate of the twentieth century had been settled saying;The collapse of the centrally planned economies discredited that model of society and vindicated market economies, in which the role of government was to regulate lightly to ensure the efficient function of the market.
However he goes on to express his own reservations with markets and expressed the view that;
Had that direction [of Hawke and Keating] continued, Labor might have produced a coherent ideology for the 21st century, based on the idea that the market is a good servant but a bad master and reserving sufficient scope for government intervention to underwrite basic living standards: capitalism with a heart, if you like.
He goes on to suggest that social policy alone might not be the saviour,
Having embraced the right's economic policies and been wedged out of any meaningful differentiation from the right, can Labor find salvation in social policy? The answer is a resounding ''no'' and the reason, ironically, is because the right has converged with the left on social policy, thereby creating a strong consensus similar to that which prevails in economic policy.
Firstly I think that the conclusion of the victory of market economies needs to be seen in the broader context of Phillip Bobbit's work - in particular Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century
. This is his analysis of the issues confronting us now based on his historical analysis in The Shield of Achilles. That work advances what could be seen as a modern rework of dialectic materialism, arguing as it does that the "world" (read Europe and the European invaded world) has gone through a series of revolutionary phases out of which a new system of government has emerged.The last phase of this was the war that ran from 1914 to 1990 between totalitarianism and market economies (as best described in Fergusson's The War of the World
).But we don't really know what the market state needs to look like, and it is incredibly exposed to terrorism. I'd extend the definition of terrorism though to include "corporate terrorism" by which I mean the actions of Transnational Corporations and their ultimate disregard of social institutions.
One difficulty for the left in all this is finding out what it stands for. One consequence has been a modern version of the "left" that defines itself by opposing anything the USA stands for - and hence will side with misogynist and oppressive regimes in opposition to the US (in particular the left's view of the war in Iraq).
Part of the difficulty is created by thinking that only the left has "compassion", which is not true. It is not even as simple as the left's greater belief in equality over the right.
Ultimately what should unite the left is the concern over power. Unions represent the need to empower workers against the interests of capital, feminism is a response to the power of men in society, the new left concern about the US is a dual concern over its single power as a "super-power" and the economic power of the many TNCs that call it home.
There is a place, indeed a need, for a strong social democratic party. It needs to be internally structured democratically for internal governance, the development of policy and the selection of candidates. But it needs a political philosophy and core set of beliefs that it seeks to promote.
That could be the future for the ALP if it is willing. Or it is an opportunity for an entirely new structure.
Novae Meridianae Demetae Dexter delenda est
Monday, March 01, 2010
Ethics, culture and the new world order
I've written a few times about Philip Bobbit and Terror and Consent. He has a really detailed set of theses about the progression of history, the interplay between strategy (as in miltary or external strategy), technology and the constitutional order.
The latest phase he identifies is the "market state". It is a state that follows on from the "nation state" and the change is a consequence of the technologies that won the "long war" for parliamentary democracy (in 1990). Those technologies were nuclear weapons, and high speed communications and information processing.
This phase he maintains creates the need to think differently about strategy and constitutional order and whether a boundary ca be maintained between them. A related theme is the reaction of certain nations to the imposition of other values.
Three stories today highlight these issues.
The first is an item calling on Israel's friends to condemn it for state sponsored terrorism. This addresses ultimately the question of the vexed problem of non-nation international terrorist groups and how nations respond. The former are engaging in a "war" yet the latter are expected to respond within the confines of accepted "constitutional order".
The US to this day regrets that they didn't act like Istrael and "took out" Osama bin Laden when they had the chance before 2001. Perhaps the missing part is creating an appropriate framework for determining when the state action can be invoked, not if.
The second example is a really simple one of the international scope of Gogle, and the report that Google execs have been convicted in Italy over the actions of someone posting a video - subsequently taken down - of a disabled teenager being bulied. This reflects the inability of existing order to address the technology.
We've had our own recent issues with something similar with the approach taken to Facebook, with comments from Qld Premiere Bligh and the five questions posed to Facebook by the Punch.
Meanwhile we have perfctly reasonable "moralising" about the treatment of women in Malaysia. This particular case opens up the absurdity of culturally relative enforceable moral codes, the application of Sharia law to women in Malaysia is as unacceptable as the application of tribal law to Australian indigenies.
The project for a modern secular ethics is becoming more urgent. It has to be secular because it has to apply to all geographies and all religions. It has to accept that individuals have the freedom to hld their own beliefs.
Only with a modern secular ethics can we build a global political philosophy within which a new definition of the role of the individual state can be developed.
The latest phase he identifies is the "market state". It is a state that follows on from the "nation state" and the change is a consequence of the technologies that won the "long war" for parliamentary democracy (in 1990). Those technologies were nuclear weapons, and high speed communications and information processing.
This phase he maintains creates the need to think differently about strategy and constitutional order and whether a boundary ca be maintained between them. A related theme is the reaction of certain nations to the imposition of other values.
Three stories today highlight these issues.
The first is an item calling on Israel's friends to condemn it for state sponsored terrorism. This addresses ultimately the question of the vexed problem of non-nation international terrorist groups and how nations respond. The former are engaging in a "war" yet the latter are expected to respond within the confines of accepted "constitutional order".
The US to this day regrets that they didn't act like Istrael and "took out" Osama bin Laden when they had the chance before 2001. Perhaps the missing part is creating an appropriate framework for determining when the state action can be invoked, not if.
The second example is a really simple one of the international scope of Gogle, and the report that Google execs have been convicted in Italy over the actions of someone posting a video - subsequently taken down - of a disabled teenager being bulied. This reflects the inability of existing order to address the technology.
We've had our own recent issues with something similar with the approach taken to Facebook, with comments from Qld Premiere Bligh and the five questions posed to Facebook by the Punch.
Meanwhile we have perfctly reasonable "moralising" about the treatment of women in Malaysia. This particular case opens up the absurdity of culturally relative enforceable moral codes, the application of Sharia law to women in Malaysia is as unacceptable as the application of tribal law to Australian indigenies.
The project for a modern secular ethics is becoming more urgent. It has to be secular because it has to apply to all geographies and all religions. It has to accept that individuals have the freedom to hld their own beliefs.
Only with a modern secular ethics can we build a global political philosophy within which a new definition of the role of the individual state can be developed.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)