I probably need to do a longer piece on this, but saying as I do there is a sorry state in Telco regulatory affairs will win me no friends. Indeed, it might even find a few people ready to hurl personal accusations about me as being "bitter" over some imagined slight.
The reality is that the state of affairs I describe is one which is driven by the same set of issues that drove the GFC (the corporate focus on the short-term outcome) and the political values of Grahame Richardson (whatever it takes).
My first case is the Mobile Terminating Access Service (MTAS) and the ACCC's process for reaching a Final Access Determination (or FAD).
The process of the ACCC setting Access Determinations was the final abandonment of the approach that initially promoted self regulation (through the TAF) and "guided" market mechanisms (negotiate-arbitrate). The experience with both of these is worthy of analysis of their own on another occasion.
The position we now have is of a central price setting regulator with limited opportunity for judicial review of decisions. The first ACCC guidance on MTAS pricing principles was to utilise a retail benchmarking approach, that access fees had to decline at the same rate as retail prices. The consequence was actually a temporary stall on price competition, as the effect of a price decline for an operator were magnified.
The Commission's next approach was based on top-down cost models from two operators. These models in one case included a highly fanciful claim for a recovery of a notional fixed line externality through a "Rohlfs-Griffin" effect, and a claim for Ramsey-Boiuteux recovery of common costs. I say fanciful because the first exercise relied upon a number of parameters that had to be guessed, not just because they hadn't been estimated but because there is no methodology to measure them. It was also fanciful because it only introduced half the externalities present in the market. The R-B pricing was fanciful because instead of estimating an Australian set of own price elasticities they used the average of various studies from other markets. They then applied these - which had been estimated using a constant elasticity assumption - to a model with a linear demand curve (where the elasticity varies along the curve).
The Commission then commissioned a bottom-up model from WIK. As I wasn't actively engaged at that time I never analysed the WIK model.
The Commission commenced its current inquiry with a radical discussion paper that considered (1) the prospect of moving to LRIC rather than TSLRIC+ pricing, (2) the option of pricing mobile-to-mobile termination differently from fixed-to-mobile and (3) the option for a "pass through" mechanism of declining MTAS rates on fixed-to-mobile calling.
A consequence of the appeal to LRIC (which really takes common costs out of the equation) is an erroneous presumption that in the long run the cost of terminating a call is zero. The most egregious part of this is the error of assuming that as a curve approaches zero then it eventually reaches it, but the zero line is an asymptote of the curve and really is never reached. The per call cost approaches zero because, in part, of increasing volumes. If calls cost 0.001 cent per minute but there are billions (or trillions) of minutes then the payment owed is still positive and significant.
The draft decision thankfully walked away from all three "radical" endeavours, but in doing so has inadequately supported the prices it has determined. This creates the image of the ACCC as a capricious regulator.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the F2M pass though argument, where Telstra has provided evidence to the Commission that its net take on fixed calling after costs has declined not increased. The ACCC could have done that investigation itself using its investigatory powers but has declined to do so. They also seem to have declined to even acknowledge the point Telstra has made. Mind you, Telstra seems to have insisted on keeping these details Commercial-In-Confidence even though they probably don't meet the formal definition (i.e. there is nothing in the data which would aid Telstra's competitors). (Note I provided a very simple version of Telstra's argument using publicly available data).
Meanwhile, Optus and Vodafone who both complain MTAS reduction without F2M pass through is a free kick to Telstra have not explained why if it is such easy money they haven't entered the market (in Vodas case a very simple F2M product by override code for existing Voda mobile customers would be relatively inexpensive to create, in Optus case add an F2M only override product).
Macquarie Telecom goes to a whole other plane of idiocy. They carefully argue that they don't actually acquire the MTAS (because they are a switchless reseller) and that the product they buy costs more than the sum of PSTN originating access (0.95c/min) and MTAS (9c/min). They don't seem to acknowledge that there is obviously a cost incurred in turning the two access components into a call, they also don't seem to contemplate the obvious answer - if you believe the cost of doing that is less than the difference between the sum of the access fees and what you pay for an FTM call, then bloody well just build the infrastructure.
The complete flip-side of that is Lycamobile pointing out that as an MVNO they are paying their wholesale provider an "airtime" rate for originating and terminating calls and that they are recipients of MTAS fees, so the decision results in a price squeeze on them. Well hello, whatever made you think MTAS wouldn't decline in the future? Have you got a regulatory events clause in your contract to trigger a renegotiation right? If not, go sue your lawyers and leave the ACCC alone.
The submissions are all the classic worst case of self-interest submissions that are not framed on the basis of an established view of how the market should operate, but instead focus on the specific "ask" of their business. These reflect the operation of the regulatory craft as something that takes instruction "from the business" rather than is intimately involved as the expert on the external environment on the development of strategy.
The ACCC deserves to be resoundly criticised for the way it has handled the MTAS determination thus far, but equally the submissions from industry players do little to handle the ACCC to account.
Nowhere, however, is the sorrt state of affairs more apparent than in the bleating by Internode (among others) of wanting to be "compensated" for the stranded asset of their DSLAM investments. The assets were not deployed like an HFC network with a thirty year or more life expectancy, more likely 2 to 3 years. None of them need to be retired immediately. The "exchange exit cost" has always been something they need to consider as a future liability.
Novae Meridianae Demetae Dexter delenda est